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Operation Rescue Versus a Woman's Right to 
Choose: A Conflict Without a Federal Remedy? 
Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin* 
In recent years, Operation Rescue and other opponents of the 
constitutionally protected right of freedom of choice have em- 
ployed an effective tactic to frustrate and impede women seeking 
to obtain abortions at  health care facilities. These groups have or- 
ganized .blockades of abortion clinics, denying women access to 
these facilities and forcing the clinics to remain closed during these 
campaigns. Often these blockades targeted small towns and cities 
and overwhelmed the ability of local law enforcement agencies to 
protect women seeking abortions. Due to the sheer number of 
blockaders, the police frequently were unable to prevent the block- 
aders from denying ingress or egress to the clinics. In light of these 
efforts to deny women access to abortion facilities, the National 
Organization for Women and similar organizations instituted fed- 
eral actions to enjoin the blockades under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).' 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Columbia University (1975); 
J.D., Harvard University (1978). 
I with to thank Adjunct Professor Elfrida A. Scott-McLaughlin, my colleague and wife, 
for her constant support, review and critique of an earlier draft of this article. Additionally, 
I wish to thank Dan Cherner and William Devito, two of my research assistants, who have 
worked with me steadfastly throughout their law school careers on several of my research 
and litigation projects. Finally, I thank Cheol Kim and Harry Phillips for their assistance in 
the research phase of this article. 
1. Section 1985(3) provides: 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the 
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of 
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or 
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing 
to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if 
two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen 
who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal man- 
ner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector 
for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or 
to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in 
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged 
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspir- 
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A $ 1985(3) claim arises when a plaintiff can prove the existence 
of a private conspiracy aimed a t  interfering with constitutionally 
protected rights secured against private encr~achment.~ The plain- 
tiffs argued in these cases that abortion is a constitutionally pro- 
tected right and that the blockades were part of a conspiracy to 
prevent women from exercising a federally protected right to travel 
interstate to obtain abortion-related  service^.^ 
These injunctive actions were successful in cases from Wichita, 
Kansas, to New York, New York." The federal courts that awarded 
injunctive relief determined that 5 1985 provided a federal remedy 
against groups of individuals who sought to blockade abortion clin- 
ics. Given the numerous cases from various states involving abor- 
tion clinic blockades, it was evident that this activity was national 
in scope and was designed to interfere with the exercise of the con- 
stitutionally protected right of women to obtain abortion related 
services. The cases also revealed that local law enforcement agen- 
cies were either unable or unwilling to guarantee women the equal 
protection of the laws. Thus, the use of 5 1985(3) was essential to 
the vindication of the right of women to exercise their constitu- 
tional rights. By providing a federal injunctive remedy, the courts 
were able to employ federal marshals and utilize the contempt 
power to jail or fine violators of the injunctions. 
On January 12, 1993, the United States Supreme Court, by a five 
acy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and 
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured 
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such in- 
jury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 
42 U.S.C. 3 1985(3) (1988). 
2. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
3. See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. 
Va. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), reu'd sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's 
Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). 
4. See, e.g., Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (6th 
Cir. 1991); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Women's Health Care Serv. v. Operation Rescue-National, 773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kan. 1991); 
Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 
1991); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 747 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1990); 
Southwestern Medical Clinics v. Operation Rescue, 744 F. Supp. 230 (D. Nev. 1989); Na- 
tional Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 19891, aff'd,  914 
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), reu'd sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 
S.Ct. 753 (1993); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712 F. 
Supp. 165 (D. Ore. 1988); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1989); New 
York National Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,  886 F.2d. 1339 
(2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); but see Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 772 
F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Ala. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992); National Abortion 
Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
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to four majority, held that the federal courts did not have author- 
ity under $ 1985(3) to enjoin abortion clinic b l~ckades .~  The ma- 
jority took an exceedingly narrow view of the scope of the statute 
and, constrained by precedentye determined that the respondents 
had not demonstrated that the petitioners' blockades were moti- 
vated by a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus or that 
they sought to interfere with constitutional rights protected 
against private encroachment.' The dissenters took issue with the 
majority's interpretation of the statute and questioned both the 
Griffin and Scott req~irements .~  
In the aftermath of the Bray decision, abortion rights activists 
turned to Congress to remedy the removal of an important federal 
remedy in the struggle between pro-choice and right-to-life organi- 
zations. On February 3, 1993, Representatives Charles Schumer 
and Constance Morella introduced the Freedom Of Access To 
Clinic Entrances Act of 1993.9 The bill seeks to create a new fed- 
eral criminal offense when an individual physically obstructs access 
to a medical facility.1° Additionally, the proposed legislation would 
provide a civil cause of action for damages and injunctive relief on 
the basis of the same acts covered under the criminal provisions of 
the bill." A similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator 
Edward Kennedy.12 The Senate Bill provides for both civil liability 
and criminal penalties in cases involving the blockades of medical 
facilities.13 If enacted, these bills could assist in replacing the pro- 
5. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, 
Kennedy and Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Souter 
filed an opinion cbncurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice O'Connor filed a dis- 
senting opinion, in which Justice Blackmun joined. 
6. The  Court in Griffin o. Breckenridge held that in order to  establish a claim under 
the statute a plaintiff must prove that there was a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' actions." 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). 
Additionally, the Court in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 
825, 832-33 (1983), held that § 1985(3) protected persons from the deprivation of constitu- 
tional rights that could be violated by private conspirators. Among the rights protected from 
private interference were the right to  interstate travel and rights within the penumbra of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. Griffin, 403 U.S. a t  105-06; Scott, 463 U.S. a t  832-33. 
7. Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753. 
8. See id .  a t  769 (Souter, J., dissenting); 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 799 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Griffin, 403 U.S. a t  105-06; Scott, 463 U.S. a t  832-33. 
9. H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
10. H.R. 796, § 2(a). See note 180 for text of the proposed legislation. 
11. H.R. 796, § 2(c). See note 180 for text of the proposed legislation. 
12. S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
13. S. 636, § 3. See note 181 for text of the proposed legislation. 
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tection of women seeking abortions that the Supreme Court with- 
drew when it ruled that $ 1985(3) could not be used to stop Opera- 
tion Rescue's blockades .of abortion clinics. 
This article discusses the need for federal protection of women 
seeking abortion-related services and the denial of protection of 
those women by the Supreme Court's narrow holding in Bray. Part 
I1 examines the precedents leading up to the Bray decision. A re- 
view of these cases demonstrates that Operation Rescue is a na- 
tional conspiracy aimed at  eliminating the right to abortion. The 
group uses physical force and blockades clinics in order to deny 
women and health care workers access to these facilities. In light of 
the inability or unwillingness of local law enforcement agencies to 
provide access to the clinics and to protect women seeking abor- 
tions, the injunctions issued under $ 1985(3) provided a needed 
federal remedy for constitutional violations. Part I11 analyzes the 
opinions in the Bray case in light of the legislative history of 
$ 1985(3). A review of the legislative history of the statute sup- 
ports the view that $ 1985(3) was intended to have a broad reach, 
encompassing conspiracies to deprive persons of constitutional 
rights without reference to the invidiously discriminatory animus 
requirement of Griff in or the limited holding in Scott. Part IV dis- 
cusses the proposed Freedom of Access Bill and concludes that 
there is a constitutional basis for such legislation. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bray, numerous federal 
courts had issued injunctions under $ 1985(3) in an effort to afford 
relief to women seeking abortions from the blockades of Operation 
Rescue and other groups that used similar tactics to oppose abor- 
tion.14 A review of several of these cases reveals that Operation 
Rescue was a loose-knit national organization, committed to break- 
ing the law in an effort to dissuade or prevent women from seeking 
abortions.16 Additionally, by force of numbers, these groups often 
overwhelm local law enforcement agencies, rendering them unable 
to protect women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to 
14. See, e.g., Women's Health Care Serv. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258 
(D. Kan. 1991); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 
617 (N.D. Cal. 1991); New York National Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247 
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989); National Org. for Women v. Operation Res- 
cue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd,  914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990). rev'd sub norn. 
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). 
15. See cases cited at note 14. 
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travel interstate to seek abortion services.le 
The courts that issued injunctions, in the face of this widespread 
conspiracy, had little trouble recognizing that women seeking abor- 
tions were a cognizable class under $ 1985(3) and that the actions 
of Operation Rescue satisfied all of the elements necessary for es- 
tablishing a claim under that-  statute. In this regard, a review of 
the legislative history of the statute reveals that the application of 
$ 1985(3) to restrain the activities of Operation Rescue was consis- 
tent with congressional intent. Thus, the Supreme Court in Bray 
betrayed both Congress's purpose in enacting $ 1985(3) and the 
women who had relied on the statute to protect them against mob 
rule. 
A. Women's Health Care Services u. Operation Rescue-National 
In Women's Health Care Services u. Operation Rescue-Na- 
tional,17 a medical facility, the Women's Health Care Services, 
challenged Operation Rescue's blockading of its clinic in Wichita, 
Kansas. The district court's findings of fact are illuminating as to 
the goals and tactics used by Operation Rescue in its direct action 
campaign in Wichita. 
The district court stated that the purpose of Operation Rescue's 
activities in Wichita was to interfere with the constitutionally pro- 
tected rights of women.l8 Counsel for the group admitted that the 
purpose of the organization was to prevent women from obtaining 
abortions.19 Counsel further stated that the tactics employed in 
achieving that objective included abusing, harassing, or intimidat- 
ing patients of the clinic so that they would not seek to enter the 
clinic and obtain an abortion.20 Another tactic designed to furthe'r 
Operation Rescue's objectives was the physical blockade of the 
driveways and doors of the clinic, thereby preventing anyone from 
entering or exiting the fa~i l i ty .~ '  
The court noted that when the physical blockade was employed, 
Operation Rescue was successful in closing down the clinics.22 Re- 
lying on videotapes of the blockades, the court determined that 
16. See cases cited at note 14. 
1.7. 773 F. Supp 258 (D. Kan. 1991). 
18. Women's Health Care Seru., 773 F .  Supp. at 261. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 262. 
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these were not spontaneous tortious or criminal acts.23 The acts of 
individual members of Operation Rescue were coordinated by sev- 
eral of the named defendants, including Randall Terry, or other 
leaders of the organi~ation.~' The leaders wore distinctive clothing 
to assist in their control of the crowds.26 They communicated with 
each other through the use of cellular phones and hand radios, and 
directions were given to the crowd via  bullhorn^.^^ I t  was clear to 
the court that the activities of Operation Rescue were part of a 
coordinated plan to deny access to abortion clinics.=' 
During the blockade, the mob would block private driveways 
leading to  the clinics.2s Additionally, the public streets in the vicin- 
ity of the clinics would also be blocked a t  the instruction of Opera- 
tion Rescue's leademae The protestors would also block the en- 
trances to  the clinics and insert .foreign substances into the door 
keyholes, thereby rendering it impossible to open the doors.30 
The court also discussed the role of the police in responding to 
Operation Rescue's tactics. The court found that the individual 
protestors would move in slow motion upon arrest, delaying the 
speed with which the police could clear the entrance to a clinic.31 
The court stated that this deliberate delaying tactic was done with 
the apparent acquiescence of either the Wichita police or the City 
of W i ~ h i t a . ~ ~  Additionally, the protestors would refuse to identify 
themselves after arrest.33 
In light of the facts of the case, the court issued a preliminary 
injunction against Operation Rescue's blockades of abortion facili- 
ties in Wi~hi ta .~ '  The court determined that the plaintiffs had es- 
tablished a clear violation of $ 1985(3) and rejected defendants' 
arguments that they had no class-based animus against women.36 
Operation Rescue contended that it was opposed to the practice of 
23. 'women's Health Care Seru., 773 F.  Supp. at 262. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Women's Health Care Seru., 773 F .  Supp. at 262. 
29. Id. The court noted that the crowds were divided into teams, and each group 
would march into place when given instructions from a leader. Id. 
30. Women's Health Care Seru., 773 F .  Supp. at 262. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 262-64. 
35. Women's Health Care Seru., 773 F.  Supp. at 262, 264. 
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abortion and was not opposed to women as a class.3e The court 
dismissed this contention and observed that the goal of the group 
was not to block the entry to the clinics, but instead to eliminate 
the right to obtain an abor t i~n.~ '  That goal infringed on the rights 
of women and women only. The court concluded that a conspiracy 
directed a t  depriving women of a constitutional right that arises 
from the natural qualities of womanhood constitutes the type of 
discriminatory animus that 5 1985(3) was designed to remedy.38 
Among the rights found to have been violated by the Operation 
Rescue conspiracy were, the rights to privacy and to travel. With 
respect to the right to privacy, the court noted that private action 
that inhibits or thwarts the ability of local law enforcement agents 
to guarantee equal protection may cause the state to further the 
ends of the con~piracy.~"y targeting Wichita as the site of its 
national effort to eradicate abortion rights, Operation Rescue over- 
whelmed the relatively small local police force, rendering it unable 
to operate effectively against the large crowds. Additionally, the 
group engaged in tactics, with apparent acquiescence on the part 
of local authorities, designed to frustrate efforts to arrest them. 
The court also found that the uncontroverted facts established 
that a significant portion of the patients served by the plaintiffs 
traveled i n t e r ~ t a t e . ~ ~  At one clinic, between 8-10% of the patients 
were from ou t -o f -~ t a t e ;~~  at  another, 44% of the patients were non- 
r e s i d e n t ~ . ~ ~  The court determined that Operation Rescue's activi- 
ties had hindered significant numbers of persons from travelling 
interstate to obtain abortion services." In light of its conclusion 
that Operation Rescue had violated 5 1985(3), the court issued an 
injunction against the blockade.'" 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 265. 
39. Id. See also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) ( " [ I j f  private persons take conspiratorial action that pre- 
vents or hinders the . . . State from giving or securing equal treatment, the private persons 
would cause those authorities to  violate the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."I. T h e  right to 
abortion is included within the penumbra o f  rights protected under the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment. Roe u. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
40. Women's Health Care Sero., 773 F. Supp. a t  265-67. 
41. Id. at 266. 
42. Id. at 266-67. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 270. 
Heinonline - -  32 Duq. L. Rev. 715 1993-1994 
7 16 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 32:709 
B. Planned Parenthood Association u. Holy Angels Catholic 
Church 
In the face of blockades of its medical clinic in Daly City, Cali- 
fornia in 1991, Planned Parenthood sought injunctive relief against 
Operation Rescue and other  defendant^.^^ The court determined 
that protestors intimidated and harassed Planned Parenthood's 
staff and patients. Individual defendants accused patients and staff 
of being "baby killers" and "murderers," attempted to intimidate 
patients from obtaining abortions, blocked entrances to the clinic, 
threatened staff members with bodily harm, and impeded the abil- 
ity of patients to walk into the clinic.46 The protestors also shoved 
plastic replicas of fetuses into the faces and cars of Planned 
Parenthood patients and staff.47 
The court decided that this conduct caused great emotional dis- 
tress to the patients and staff of the clinic.48 Patients were often so 
upset by the protestors' conduct that they had to reschedule their 
appointments, requiring more advanced and potentially dangerous 
medical  procedure^.^^ In addition, the clinic had to obtain volun- 
teers to escort the patients from their cars because of the aggres- 
sive conduct of the  protestor^.^^ Planned Parenthood sought police 
assistance, but the police claimed that an injunction was required 
before they could take a c t i ~ n . ~ '  
On the basis of these facts, the district court issued an injunc- 
tion against the  protestor^.^^ The court rejected Operation Res- 
cue's contention that it harbored no ill-will towards the patients of 
the clinics, but was opposed to abortion as a practice.63 While 
agreeing that the group had a right to protest, the court concluded 
that Operation Rescue's conduct infringed on the right of women 
45. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 
(N.D. Cal. 1991). The Holy Angels Catholic Church was named as a defendant due to the 
activities of the pastor of that church. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco 
filed a declaration with the court stating that the Archdiocese was the owner of the defend- 
ant church and did not condone or encourage interference with the operation of the plain- 
tiffs clinic. Accordingly, the court ruled that the injunction it issued would not run against 
the church. Planned Parenthood, 765 F. Supp. at  619. 
46. Id. at 620. 
47. Id.  
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Planned Parenthood, 765 F. Supp. at  620-21. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at  620. 
53. Id.  at  623-24. 
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to obtain abortions.64 There was evidence that women were so in- 
timidated by the invasive conduct of the defendants that they 
delayed the abortion procedure, thereby exposing themselves to 
physical harm.66 In finding that Operation Rescue had displayed 
the requisite animus, the court noted that the defendants were not 
required to actually dislike or hate women in order to violate 
$ 1985(3).66 
In reaching its conclusion that the defendants had' violated 
$ 1985(3), the court based its decision on the right to travel.67 In 
concluding that Operation Rescue's blockade interfered with the 
right to travel, the court noted that the Supreme Court had deter- 
mined that citizens of the United States had the right to travel 
across state lines,68 and that private conspiracies to deprive citi- 
zens of this right were actionable under the statute.6s Thus, the 
court concluded that Operation Rescue's blockades had the pro- 
scribed effect of depriving citizens of the right to traveL60 The 
court rejected the defendants' two-fold argument wherein the de- 
fendants' contended that they did not intentionally interfere with 
the right to travel, but instead, were opposed to all women, resi- 
dents and non-residents, obtaining  abortion^.^' The court deter- 
mined that the interference with the right to travel was found in 
the fact that the protestors, by their conduct, had impaired the 
right of pregnant women to travel to obtain abortion services.62 
The defendants may have harassed all women equally, but that did 
not mean that they had not violated the rights of some women to 
travel.63 Accordingly, the court issued a preliminary injunction 
against Operation Rescue's blockade.e4 
54. Id. 
55. Planned Parenthood, 765 F .  Supp. at 623-24. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 624. See, e.g., United States v .  Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
59. Planned Parenthood, 765 F.Supp. at 624. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 
U.S. 88 (1971). 
60. Planned Parenthood, 765 F .  Supp. at 624. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. See also Doe v .  Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (The Court struck down a state 
residency requirement that impaired the right o f  nonresident women to  seek medical ser- 
vices as violative o f  the constitutional right to  travel.). 
64. Planned Parenthood, 765 F .  Supp. at 626. 
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C. New York National  Organization for W o m e n  v. Terry 
In New York National  Organization for W o m e n  v. Terry,66 a co- 
alition of women's organizations and abortion providers initiated 
an action under § 1985(3) against Operation Rescue and sought in- 
junctive relief prohibiting the defendants from blocking access to 
medical facilities in the New York metropolitan area.66 The district 
court, in its opinion granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judg- 
ment, recited the following facts. Operation Rescue had organized 
and publicized a week of protests to be carried out in the New 
York c i ty  area from April 30, 1988, until May 7, 1988.67 Protestors 
would converge each day on an abortion clinic in an effort to close 
down the fa~ili ty. '~ The targeted facility was not notified in ad- 
vance of the d e m o n s t r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
On May 2, 1988, Operation Rescue conducted a demonstration 
in front of a physician's office in Manhattan.70 Five hundred 
protestors blocked access to the physician's office for a t  least five 
hours, and the police arrested 503 demonstrators for disorderly 
conduct.71 On the following day, several hundred demonstrators 
were arrested in Queens, New York, for blocking access to an abor- 
tion clinic.72 On May 5, 1988, Operation Rescue blocked access to 
an abortion clinic in Hicksville, Long Island, for approximately 
three On May 6, 1988, demonstrators returned to the 
Manhattan physician's office and again blocked access to that 
On the basis of the factual record, the court determined that all 
of the elements of a § 1985(3) claim were satisfied. The court ruled 
that gender-based discrimination satisfied the animus requirement 
of 5 1985(3).76 In light of the defendants' admissions that their ac- 
65. 704 F. Supp 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
66. Terry,  704 F. Supp. 1250-51. 
67. Id.  at  1251. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.  
71. Terry ,  704 F. Supp. a t  1251. 
72. Id. at  1252. 
73. Id. 
74. Id.  
75. Id. at  1259. A number of circuit courts had also held that gender-based discrimi- 
nation is actionable under 1 1985(3). See e.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 
1988); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1984); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 19781, vacated on  other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 
(1979); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979); Conroy v. 
Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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tivities were targeted at  women who choose abortion, the court 
concluded that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy with 
a proscribed ~bjective.~' The court also ruled that the undisputed 
facts established that the defendants' activities had obstructed ac- 
cess to medical facilities by women who had traveled from out of 
state.77 Additionally, the actions of the defendants had interfered 
with the plaintiffs' constitutionally guaranteed right to travel.78 
In addition to finding for the plaintiffs on the right to travel is- 
sue, the court also considered the plaintiffs' claim that Operation ' 
Rescue sought to deprive the plaintiffs and the classes they repre- 
sented of their right to privacy under the hindrance clause of 
$ 1985(3).78 In contrast to the right to travel claim, there must be 
a claim of state involvement to prevail on a claim involving the 
deprivation of a right to privacy.e0 On the right to privacy claim, 
the court found that the defendants, by blocking access to abortion 
clinics in large numbers and by refusing to notify the police of 
their next target, had acted to render police officials incapable of 
providing women who choose abortion equal access to medical 
treatment.8' There was additional evidence of state involvement in 
the conspiracy. The court found that at  an October 29th demon- 
stration in Dobbs Ferry, New York, the local police entered into an 
express agreement with Operation Rescue that no demonstrator 
would be arrested so long as the demonstrators agreed to leave the 
site by noon that day.82 On the basis of the'record, the court con- 
cluded that under the hindrance clause of § 1985(3), the plaintiffs 
had established a claim and that their rights to privacy had been 
violated.83 In light of the foregoing, the district court issued a per- 
76. Terry, 704 F .  Supp. at 1259. 
77. Id. at 1259-60. The court concluded that the right to travel includes the right to 
unimpeded interstate access to obtain an abortion and other medical services. Id. See also, 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). 
78. Terry, 704 F. Supp. at 1260. Because the right to travel can be violated by private 
actors, the plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate state involvement. See, e.g., Grifin, 
403 U.S. at 105-06. 
79. Terry, 704 F .  Supp. a t  1260. Under 3 1985(3)'s hindrance clause, liability is es- 
tablished if it is shown that two or more persons conspire for the purpose of preventing or 
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all 
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws. Id. 
80. Id. See also, Scott, 463 U.S. at 833. 
81. Terry, 704 F. Supp. a t  1260. 
82. Id. at  1260 n.16. 
83. Id. at  1260. Under the hindrance clause, if private actors engage in a conspiracy 
that prevents or hinders the local state authorities from providing equal treatment, the pri- 
vate persons would cause those authorities to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection clause. When such a conspiracy has the effect of rendering state authorities inca- 
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manent injunction restraining Operation Rescue's  blockade^.^' 
On appeal, the circuit court upheld the district court's issuance 
of the permanent injunction as a remedy for the $ 1985(3) viola- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  The appellate court rejected defendants' arguments that 
they held no animus towards women and that they were only seek- 
ing to demonstrate their opposition to abortion.8e The circuit court 
stated that, in most cases of discrimination, constitutionally viola- 
tive activity occurs as a response to activities that members of a 
certain class engage in which are abhorrent to the opponents of 
that  ond duct.^' The court found that one of the objectives of the 
defendants was to infringe on the right of women to gain access to 
abortion facilities, and that the defendants' conduct had that re- 
s ~ l t . ~ ~  The circuit court also upheld the district court's conclusion 
that Operation Rescue's blockades had violated the right to inter- 
state travel, but found it unnecessary to rule on the question of 
whether Operation Rescue had also violated the hindrance clause 
of § 1985(3) by impeding state authorities from providing protec- 
tion to women seeking  abortion^.^^ 
D. National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue 
In National Organization for Women u. Operation Rescue,go the 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin Operation Rescue's blockades of abor- 
tion clinics in the Washington, .D.C. metropolitan area. The court 
found that the organization and its members would blockade an 
abortion clinic's entrances and exits, effectively closing the facility 
and denying women access.91 The purpose of Operation Rescue's 
blockading of abortion clinics was to disrupt operations a t  these 
facilities and to cause the clinics to cease operation entirely.92 The 
court stated that, by disrupting these clinics, "the defendants . . . 
hoped to prevent abortions, to dissuade women from seeking a 
pable of providing equal protection of the laws, $ 1985(3) would provide the means of reme- 
dying such conduct. Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
84. Terry, 704 F. Supp. at 1263-64. 
85. New York Nat'l Org. for Women u. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1989). 
86. Terry, 886 F. 2d a t  1359-60. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 1360. 
89. Id. at  1360-61. 
90. 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 19891, aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. l990), reu'd sub 
nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). 
91. N.O. W., 726 F. Supp. at  1487. 
92. Id. at  1488. 
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clinic's abortion services, and to impress upon members of society 
the . . . intensity of Operation Rescue's anti-abortion views."8s 
The court found that the practice of preventing access to these fa- 
cilities could be harmful to the health of women seeking or under- 
going abortion-related treatment.e4 In addition to the risk to the 
physical health of the patients, the court concluded that these 
blockades could impose stress, anxiety, and mental harm on pa- 
tients or potential patients.e6 
The court also found that substantial numbers of women seeking 
abortions in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area traveled in- 
terstate to reach the clinics.B6 The court held that the blockading 
of abortion clinics had the effect of obstructing and interfering 
with the interstate travel of these women.e7 The court further held 
that Operation Rescue was able to close down clinics notwithstand- 
ing the efforts of the local police to prevent the clinics from being 
closed.g8 The court determined that limited police department re- 
sources, combined with the lack of advance notice identifying a 
target clinic, rendered it difficult for local police to prevent rescu- 
ers from closing a facility.ee 
After determining that the defendants had engaged in conduct 
93. Id.  a t  1488. 
94. Id. a t  1489. Specifically, the court found that  for some women who elect to un- 
dergo an abortion, a pre-abortion laminaria is inserted to  achieve proper cervical dilation. In 
order to  avoid infection, such devices must be removed in a timely fashion. If the defend- 
ants closed a facility, women seeking laminaria removal would be placed a t  risk or would 
have to  seek services elsewhere. There were numerous economic and psychological barriers 
to  obtaining these services elsewhere. The court found that  indigent or impecunious patients 
were provided abortion services a t  nominal fees by the clinics, whereas hospitals would re- 
quire insurance or full payment. Thus, for these women Operation Rescue's blockade of an 
abortion facility could impose serious health risks. Id .  
95. Id. 
96. N.O.W., 726 F. Supp. a t  1489. Approximately 20-30% of the patients served a t  
the Commonwealth Women's Clinic in Falls Church, Virginia, came from out of state. The 
records of these patients revealed they had permanent residences in Maryland, the District 
of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and Florida. At 
the Hillview Women's Center in Forestville, Maryland, a majority of the patients traveled 
interstate to reach that clinic. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. T o  support this conclusion, the court relied on trial testimony relating to  the 
closing of the Commonwealth Women's Clinic. Tha t  clinic had been the object of Operation 
Rescue's blockades on almost a weekly basis for five years prior to  the litigation. On October 
29, 1988, the clinic was closed by the blockade despite the efforts of the Falls Church Police 
Department to keep the facility open. The testimony revealed that  the department con- 
sisted of 30 deputized officers. On the date in question, the blockaders outnumbered the 
police officers, and even though 240 arrests were made, the clinic was closed for more than 
six hours. Id. a t  n.4. 
99. Id. 
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that could result in a deprivation of constitutional rights, the court 
analyzed the facts to ascertain whether a 3 1985(3) violation was 
established. The court found that gender-based discrimination sat- 
isfied the class-based discriminatory animus element of the stat- 
ute.loO Thus, a conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortions of 
their right to travel interstate to obtain such services was actiona- 
ble under the statute.lo1 Based on its factual findings, the court 
concluded that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to de- 
prive women seeking abortions or related medical services of the 
right to travel.lo2 Furthermore, the court determined that since the 
right to interstate travel is protected against both purely private as 
well as governmental interference, there was no need to show state 
action.lo3 Having determined that the plaintiffs had established a 
violation of § 1985(3), the court issued a permanent injunction 
against the defendants, preventing them from staging further 
blockades of any Washington, D.C. metropolitan area abortion 
clinic.lo4 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision and the 
issuance of the permanent i n j u n c t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  The court agreed that 
gender-based animus satisfied the purpose element of § 1985(3).'08 
The circuit also upheld the district court's conclusion that blocking 
access to medical services provided by abortion facilities that serve 
interstate clientele violated the constitutional right to interstate 
travel. lo' 
E. Operation Rescue Parallels the Ku Klux Klan 
The facts set forth in these four cases are representative of the 
conduct of Operation Rescue in demonstrating its opposition to 
abortion. The cases reveal that the organization went beyond the 
mere expression of a political viewpoint. I t  is clear that Operation 
Rescue and its adherents sought to eliminate abortion as a consti- 
tutional right and to impede women seeking to exercise their 
rights. The tactics used in furtherance of these ends were intimida- 
tion, threats of physical violence, and the blockading of clinic en- 
I d .  at 1492. 
N.O. W., 726 F. Supp. at 1493. 
Id .  
Id .  
Id. at 1497. 
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990). 
N.O. W., 914 F.2d at 585. 
Id .  
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trances. These tactics were used on a national scale and often over- 
whelmed the ability of local law enforcement personnel to secure 
to women seeking abortion-related services equal protection of the 
laws. 
Additionally, the facts demonstrate that the use of these tactics 
was not a spontaneous eruption of individual activity. Operation 
Rescue's adherents were disciplined and well organized. The 
crowds were placed into teams, with team leaders who gave orders 
as to how to proceed. Thus, the activities of the group were evi- 
dence of a conspiracy to obstruct women in the exercise of a con- 
stitutional right. As many women a t  the clinics travelled interstate 
to receive these services, the group also impaired the ability of 
these women to travel freely. 
The conduct of Operation Rescue is strikingly similar to the ac- 
tions of another well-organized group that sought to frustrate and 
impede national policy in the nineteenth century-the Ku Klux 
Klan. In fact, Congress enacted 5 1985(3) due to the widespread 
fear and intimidation that the Klan visited on African-Americans 
and their supporters during the Reconstruction era.'08 A review of 
the legislative history of 5 1985(3) shows that the evil Congress 
sought to remedy in that statute was similar to the actions of Op- 
eration Rescue. Therefore 5 1985(3) has been appropriately used 
by the courts to protect the rights of women to seek abortion 
services. 
During the debate on $ 1985(3),loe the speakers discussed the 
evidence and nature of the problem which the Klan and similar 
organizations presented.l1° The incidents graphically recounted the 
108. Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The 
Supreme Court's Next Opportunity to Unsettle Civil Rights Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1357 
(1992). 
109. Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. $$ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988). For a detailed analysis 
o f  the legislative history of  the Act, see Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme Court's Next Opportunity to Unsettle Civil Rights 
Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1357 (1992); Neil H .  Cogan, Section 1985(3)'s Restructuring of Equal- 
ity: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 515 (1987); 
Marilyn R. Walter, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the State Action Requirement of the Four- 
teenth Amendment, 58 TEMP. L. Q. 3 (1985). 
110. There were no evidentiary hearings held prior to the introduction of  the Ku Klux 
Klan Act. Congress relied on a report issued by a Select Committee of the Senate to Investi- 
gate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States. S. Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871). 
While the committee was established to examine the existence of  the Klan in the southern 
states, it was only able to investigate conditions in South Carolina. The report concluded 
that the Klan was responsible for numerous murders, whippings and shootings in that state. 
Regarding the purpose of  the Klan, the report found that the Klan was opposed to the 
policies of Reconstruction, including the enfranchisement of  African-Americans. See EVE- 
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evil that the Klan represented, its purposes, and the methods used 
to effectuate its ends. The evidence revealed that the Klan used 
violence and terror against African-Americans, their supporters, 
and Republicans in an effort to undo the gains of the Reconstruc- 
tion era."' The Klan also directed its anger at  northerners who 
went south after the war, and at  native southerners who supported 
the Reconstruction policies of the federal government.l12 In addi- 
tion, the Klan sought to supplant state and local governments by 
the use of the same tactics against government officials.l13 In some 
instances, those officials either acquiesced. or conspired with the 
Klan.l14 Finally, the Klan vented its fury on indicia of federal 
authority.l16 
Several speakers in the House supported the thesis that the 
Klan was a covert, terrorist organization designed to eliminate the 
gains of R e c o n s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~ ~  Similar views were expressed in the 
Senate regarding the aim of the Klan. Senator Oliver P. Morton' 
stated that the purpose of the Klan was to use terror and violence 
to intimidate African-Americans and others from supporting the 
Republican party and its political objectives.'17 Senator Morton 
RETTE SWINNEY, SUPPRESSING THE KU KLUX KLAN: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE RECONSTRUC- 
TION AMENDMENTS 1870-77 (1987); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR. THE KU KLUX KLAN 
CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971). 
111. The testimony of James E. Boyd before the Senate Select Committee, relied upon 
by Representative William Stoughton in support of the Ku Klux Klan Act, is illustrative of 
the facts available to Congress. Boyd was a lawyer, a former Confederate soldier, and a 
Klansmen from Alamance County, North Carolina. He testified that the Klan's purpose was 
to defeat the Reconstruction policy of Congress and to prevent African-Americans from vot- 
ing. Boyd averred that the Klan used any means necessary to carry out its objectives, in- 
cluding murder. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1871). 
112. CONG. GLOBE, cited a t  note 111, a t  320. 
113. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, cited a t  note 111, a t  484 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id. at  
484 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); see generally DAVID M .  CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM 
(1965). 
114. CONG. GLOBE, cited a t  note 111, at  78. Representative Aaron F. Perry stated, 
"Where these gangs . . . show themselves the rest of the people look on, if not with sympa- 
thy, a t  least with forbearance. . . . Sheriffs, having eyes to  see, see not." See also, id. a t  368 
(remarks of Rep. Sheldon) and id. at  107 (remarks of Sen. Pool). 
115. Representative Butler stated that federal agents were whipped and shot a t  for 
attempting to carry out their duties. Cong. Globe, cited a t  note 111, a t  445. 
116. CONG. GLOBE, cited a t  note 111, a t  app. 153. Representative Garfield stated "that 
in some of the southern States there exists a wide-spread secret'organization . . . to prevent 
certain classes of citizens of the United States from enjoying these new rights conferred 
upon them by the Constitution and laws." Id. Accord, e.g., id. a t  459 (remarks of Rep. John 
Coburn); id. a t  443-49 (remarks of Rep. Benjamin F. Butler); id. a t  320-21 (remarks of Rep. 
Stoughton); id. a t  339 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. a t  437 (remarks of Rep. Clinton L. 
Cobb). 
117. CONC. GLOBE, cited a t  note 111, at  app. 252. Senator Morton stated that "the 
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was not only concerned with the actual victims of the Klan's ter- 
ror, but also expressed his belief that the violent actions of the 
Klan would discourage others from exercising their constitutional 
rights.l18 In addition to targeting African-Americans and Republi- 
cans for their peculiar brand of persuasion, the Klan also victim- 
ized others whose political views were inimical to the Klan.lle 
The proponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act saw the Klan as a 
well-organized group that was opposed to the national policy of 
Reconstruction and equality for African-Americans. In both the 
Senate and the House, concerns were expressed about the depriva- 
tion of rights by the Klan based on a variety of identifiers, such as 
race, political views, religion, or regional origins. In the minds of 
those who supported the statute, it was designed to remedy the 
denial of rights guaranteed under the Constitution to all classes of 
citizens targeted by the Klan or other  organization^.'^^ No sup- 
porter indicated any intention to limit the application of the stat- 
ute to conspiracies motivated by racial animus. The incidents dis- 
cussed by the supporters of the statute confirm that the Klan was 
an organization that engaged in violence and acts of intimidation 
against groups or individuals in an effort to reverse the gains of the 
Reconstruction era. The Klan also sought to render law enforce- 
ment agents, who often acquiesced in the Klan's intimidation tac- 
tics, ineffective. 
purpose is . . . to drive those who are supporting the Republican party to abandon their 
political faith or to flee from the State." Id. See, e.g., id. at  app. 107 (remarks of Sen. John 
Pool); id. at  157 (remarks of Sen. Sherman); id. at  197 (remarks of Sen. Ames). 
118. CONC. GLOBE, cited at  note 111, at  app. 252. Senator Morton stated that "[tlhe 
whipping of a dozen Negroes, because they are Negroes and asserting their rights to equal 
enjoyment of liberty. . . and the expression of their opinions, will have the effect to terrify 
those who live for miles around." Id. 
119. Id. at  app. 311. In this regard, Representative Maynard stated: 
[Tlhe unpopular man, the man who entertains odious sentiments, the man whose 
religion . . . is at  variance with the common belief, the man whose political views do 
not accord with the generally received opinions of the community in which he resides, 
finds his personal security very often in peril from the ebullitions of passion and the 
gusts of anger which agitate his immediate neighbors. 
Id. 
In Maynard's opinion, 3 1985(3) was designed to protect all classes of persons who were 
subjected to attack for their political views or racial group status. Id. at  app. 310. See also 
id. at  320 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 339 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. a t  app. 262 
(remarks of Rep. Dunnell); id. at  app. 277 (remarks of Rep. Porter); id. at  394 (remarks of 
Rep. Rainey); id. a t  459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id. at  app. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt); 
id. at app. 300 (remarks of Rep. Stevenson); id. at  app. 251 (remarks of Sen. Morton); id. at  
567 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id. at  660 (remarks of Sen. Blair); id. at  686 (remarks of 
Sen. Schurz); id. a t  606 (remarks of Sen. Pool). 
120. See note 119 and accompanying text. 
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There are numerous parallels between the Klan and Operation 
Rescue. Both organizations opposed a national policy. The Klan 
sought to reverse the gains of Reconstruction, and Operation Res- 
cue sought to eliminate abortion rights. Both groups used intimi- 
dation tactics as a means of achieving their ends. Both groups 
targeted individuals who sought to exercise constitutional rights. 
The Klan sought to reverse the gains made by African-Americans 
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Operation 
Rescue sought to reverse the Supreme Court's opinion in Roe v. 
Wade.121 Operation Rescue also sought to prevent women from ex- 
ercising their constitutionally protected right to obtain an abortion 
and to travel interstate for that purpose. Both organizations, 
through sheer numbers or the use of intimidation tactics, were able 
to render ineffective local governments and law enforcement 
agents. In light of the parallels between the activities of the Klan 
and Operation Rescue, the statute designed by Congress to curb 
the former should have been applicable to the latter. Clearly, Op- 
eration Rescue is an interstate entity, committed to employing ex- 
tralegal means to accomplish its objectives. Operation Rescue's 
blockades have the effect of intimidating women from seeking 
abortion services and impeding the interstate travel of women to 
obtain such services. Thus, the federal remedy created by Congress 
in 5 1985(3) seems appropriate in the context of Operation Res- 
cue's blockade of abortion clinics. Unfortunately, in Bray u. Alex- 
andria Women's Health Clinic122 a majority of the Supreme Court 
disagreed with this position. 
In Bray, the majority opinion began its analysis of 5 1985(3) by 
reviewing the Court's precedent regarding the interpretation of the 
statute.123 In order to prevail on a § 1985(3) claim, a plaintiff has 
to show the existence of a private conspiracy aimed at  interfering 
with constitutional rights that are protected against private or offi- 
cial en~r0achmen t . l~~  The Court had also noted in that 
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
122. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). 
123. For an analysis of the facts and lower court holdings in Bray, see notes 90-104 
and accompanying text. 
124.' Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758. See also Grifin,  403 U.S. at 102; Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 
833. 
125. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 
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the conspiracy must have been motivated by an invidiously, dis- 
criminatory intent. The Grif f in majority explained the rationale for 
the discriminatory intent requirement as necessary to avoid inter- 
preting the statute as a general federal tort law.12e 
The Bray Court took note of the respondents' contention that 
opposition to abortion constituted the type of discriminatory ani- 
mus that would satisfy Griffin's class-based intent r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ' ~ ~  
The majority, however, rejected this argument, stating that opposi- 
tion to abortion did not constitute discrimination against a class of 
women seeking abortions.lZ8 The Court opined that the term 
"class" as used in Grif f in meant more than a group that shares a 
common desire to engage in conduct that is opposed by another 
group of persons.'2e According to the majority, if a class could be 
defined so easily, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to as- 
sert claims under § 1985(3) and the result that the Griffin Court 
sought to avoid would be realized.'" Accordingly, the majority con- 
cluded that "women seeking an abortion" did not qualify as a class 
for $ 1985(3) purposes.'31 
Additionally, the majority rejected the respondents' contention 
that Operation Rescue was motivated by a discriminatory animus 
against women in general.132 The Court found that the record did 
not indicate that Operation Rescue's blockades were motivated by 
a purpose directed specifically a t  women as a ~ 1 a s s . l ~ ~  The group 
defined its conduct as a rescue of innocent victims from abortion- 
i s t ~ . ' ~ ~  Based on the record, the Court concluded that Operation 
Rescue's actions were not motivated by a discriminatory animus 
towards women, but by its intense opposition to abortion.'36 
126. Id. The  Court stated that the language of the statute, requiring intent t o  deprive 
persons of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities, meant that  there 
must be some "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus 
behind the conspirators' action." Id.  
127. Bray, 113 S. Ct. a t  759. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id.  
132. Bray, 113 S. Ct. a t  760. 
133. Id. a t  759. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. a t  760. The  Court noted: 
Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common and 
respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of or condescension toward (or 
indeed any view a t  all concerning) women as a class-as is evident from the fact that 
men and women are on both sides of the issue, just as men and women are on both 
sides of petitioners' unlawful demonstrations. 
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The Court also determined that respondents' $ 1985(3) claim 
failed because they had not established that Operation Rescue's 
conspiracy was aimed a t  depriving them of a right guaranteed 
against private encroa~hment . '~~  Respondents contended that Op- 
eration Rescue sought to deprive women of their constitutionally 
protected right to travel, relying on the fact that substantial num- 
bers of women seeking services a t  the respondent clinics travelled 
interstate to reach these facilities.lg7 The majority rejected this as- 
sertion, concluding that $ 1985(3) requires that the conspiracy 
must be for the purpose of depriving others of a constitutional 
right.lg8 In other words, the $ 1985(3) defendant must have taken 
his or her action with an intent to deprive others of a right, and 
the conspiracy must have been entered into for the purpose of ef- 
fectuating such deprivation. The Court reasoned that Operation 
Rescue was opposed to abortion, and it was irrelevant to the 
group's actions whether the abortions were performed after inter- 
state travel.lg9 The Court, however, did agree with the respondents 
that Operation Rescue's conduct was aimed at the right of abor- 
tion,140 but concluded that such an objective was not actionable 
under $ 1985(3) absent a showing of state in~olvement.'~' 
Id. 
136. Id. at 762. 
137. Bray, 113 S. Ct. a t  762. 
138. Id .  
139. Id. at  763. 
140. Id.  at 764. The right to abortion has been considered by the Court as within the 
penumbra of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 
(1973). 
141. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at  763. In Carpenters, the Court held that 8 1985(3) did not 
apply to private conspiracies that "are aimed at a right that is by definition a right only 
against state interference." Carpenters, 463 U.S. a t  833. The Court has held that the right 
to interstate travel and the right to be free from involuntary servitude are subject to inter- 
ference by private actors. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) 
(right to interstate travel); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-40 (1968) (Thir- 
teenth Amendment's protections can be infringed by private persons). Other constitutional 
rights that are protected from invasion by private individuals are the federal right to free 
access to the seat of government, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); the right 
peaceably to assemble to petition the government, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 
552 (1876) ("The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning 
Congress for a redress of grievances . . . is an attribute of national citizenship."), Slaughter- 
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); the right of protection from attack while in the 
custody of a federal marshall, Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 285 (1884); and the 
right to inform federal officers of violations of federal law, In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535- 
36 (1895). 
It  is well established that Congress has the power to legislate for the protection of these 
fundamental rights against private interference. See, e.g., Guest, 383 U.S. at  760 n.17 
("[Tlhe constitutional right of interstate travel is a right secured against interference from 
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Finally, the majority discussed whether the respondents had es- 
tablished a violation of the "hindrance" clause of Q 1985(3).14= Af- 
ter stating that this issue was not properly before the Court,14$ the 
majority went on to suggest that a claim under the "hindrance" 
clause requires the same elements as claims under the "depriva- 
tion" clause of Q 1985(3).144 Therefore, on the basis of its rulings 
that respondents had not established the class-based animus re- 
quired under the statute and that Operation Rescue's conduct was 
not aimed at  depriving women of the right to interstate travel, the 
Court questioned whether respondents could have succeeded on a 
hindrance ~ 1 a i m . l ~ ~  
Justice Souter, while concurring in the judgment, took issue with 
the majority's approach to the class-based animus issue. While ac- 
knowledging that stare decisis necessitated adherence to Griffin's 
motivation element, Justice Souter questioned whether the Court 
had interpreted Q 1985(3) correctly when it announced the animus 
criterion.l4" In his view, the animus requirement had narrowed the 
scope of the statute to the point of overkill."' Justice Souter 
stated that there was no indication in the legislative history that 
Congress intended the statute to reach only conspiracies motivated 
by racial animus or similar  characteristic^.'^^ The list of character- 
any source whatever, whether governmental or private."); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 
347 (1915); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); 
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884); see 
also Howard M .  Feuerstein, Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal Power to Punish Private 
Individuals for Interference with Federally Secured Rights, 19 VAND. L. REV. 642, 651-65 
(1966). 
142. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 764-65. The "hindrance" clause of 3 1985(3) is violated if "two 
or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of preventing or hindering the consti- 
tuted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such 
State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. 8 1985(3). 
143. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at  764-65. The Court noted that the complaint did not expressly 
include a claim under the hindrance clause and that this issue was not included within the 
questions on which the sought certiorari. Id. Justice Souter, in the dissenting 
portion of his opinion, disagreed with the majority's conclusion on this issue and stated that 
the applicability of the hindrance clause was fairly included within the questions presented. 
Id. at 770. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
144. Id. a t  776. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at  776. 
147. Id. at  772. 
148. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
There is ample support in the legislative history for the proposition that Congress intended 
the statute to reach conspiracies designed to deny any class of persons, without regard to 
race, rights protected by the Constitution. With respect to the groups within the penumbra 
of the statute, Senator Edmunds stated: 
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be called a private 
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istics identified in the legislative history as within the scope- of 
§ 1985(3) was far broader than race.lqB Furthermore, no sponsor 
suggested that only conspiracies motivated by a discriminatory an- 
imus would fall within the purview of the statute. The legislative 
- 
history supports the conclusion that a class under § 1985(3) could 
have a very broad definition. Nevertheless, due to the Court's ear- 
lier misreading of the statute and the weight of stare decisis, both 
the majority and Justice Souter were unwilling to revisit the ques- 
tion of the classes protected under the deprivation clause of the 
Justice Souter did not feel similarly restrained in the interpreta- 
conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against 
another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men for 
burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this conspiracy 
was formed against this man because he was a Democrat, . . . , or because he was a 
Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter . . . then 
this section could reach it. 
CONG. GLOBE, cited at  note 111, at  567. 
Senator Morton also had an expansive view of the scope of classes protected under the 
statute: 
If there be organizations in any of the States having for their purpose to deny to any 
class or condition or men equal protection, to deny to them the equal enjoyment of 
rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, it is the right and duty of 
Congress to make such organizations and combinations an offense against the United 
States. 
Id. app. at  251. 
Similar views were expressed in the House. Representative Maynard stated that "[ulnder 
this section I hold that if a body of men conspire to drive out all the northern men, all the 
'Yankees,' all the 'carpet-baggers' from the community, their offense comes within the con- 
demnation of this provision." Id. app. at  310; see also, e.g., id. at  332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) 
("[Llarge numbers of our fellow-citizens are deprived of the enjoyment of the fundamental 
rights of citizens . . . because their opinions on questions of public interest do not coincide 
with those of a majority of the American people."); id.  at app. 311 (remarks of Rep. May- 
nard) ("[Tlhe unpopular man, . '. . , the man whose political views do not accord with the 
generally received opinions of the community in which he resides, finds his personal security 
. . . in peril"); id. at  320-21 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 339 (remarks of Rep. Kel- 
ley); id. at  394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey). 
As is evident, the legislative history supports Justice Souter's view that the Court in Grif- 
fin had misinterpreted 1 1985(3) when it created a class-based, invidiously discriminatory 
animus requirement as an element of a claim under the statute. It was this requirement that 
the Bray majority found lacking in the respondents' case, because the respondents did not 
show that Operation Rescue bore ill will towards women as a group. Clearly, the sponsors 
and supporters of the Ku Klux Klan Act did not believe that that type of intent was neces- 
sary under the statute. 
149. CONC. GLOBE, cited at  note 111, a t  567. 
150. Bray, 113 S. Ct. a t  771-72 (Souter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The first clause of 1 1985(3) covers conspiracies for the purpose of depriving any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities 
under the law. 42 U.S.C. 1 1985(3). 
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tion of the hindrance or prevention clause of the statute.lS1 As a 
threshold matter, since the Court had not yet interpreted the hin- 
drance clause, the burden of precedent was nonexistent.lS2 Justice 
Souter believed that it was unnecessary to read Griffin's limiting 
interpretation into the hindrance clause because in order to violate 
the hindrance clause a private conspiracy must act with enough 
force to overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to secure equal 
protection of the law.lS3 In ,order to satisfy the requirement of af- 
fecting the law enforcement authorities, a conspiracy would have 
to be able to counter large numbers of police officers.lS4 Thus, Jus- 
tice Souter contended that the requirement that the conspiracy 
have the capacity to overwhelm a local law enforcement agency 
sufficiently narrowed the scope of 5 1985(3)'s hindrance clause so 
that the discriminatory animus provision of the deprivation clause 
was unnecessary.16s 
Additionally, Justice Souter believed that the requirement that a 
§ 1985(3) conspiracy be aimed a t  a right susceptible to private en- 
croachment should not be read into the hindrance clause. Unlike 
the deprivation clause, a conspiracy under the hindrance clause 
would have as its goal the prevention or hindrance of state actors 
from providing equal protection to its citizens or other persons 
within the state. The objective of such a conspiracy is to prevent 
local law enforcement officers from discharging their constitutional 
duties. In a sense, the conspiracy's aim would be to supplant or 
replace state power and determine how that power was to be exer- 
cised. Under Justice Souter's analysis, Congress has the power to 
prevent state authorities from abridging Fourteenth Amendment 
rights and to legislate against the usurpation of state power by a 
conspiratorial mob.lS6 Accordingly, Justice Souter concluded that 
151. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at  771-72 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
"The second clause of the statute prohibits conspiracies for the purpose of preventing or 
hindering state authorities from securing to all persons within such state the equal protec- 
tion of the laws." id. 
152. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at  771 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at  771, 775. 
156. Id. at  776. There is support in the legislative history for Justice Souter's view 
regarding the hindrance clause. Representative Horatio C. Burchard contended that Con- 
gress had the power to "punish the illegal attempts of private individuals [who sought] to 
prevent the performance of official duties in the manner required by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States." CONG. GLOBE, cited at  note 111, at  app. 314. Representative 
Luke P. Poland shared this view of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment: 
When the state has provided the law, and has provided the officer to carry out the 
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the hindrance clause may be applied to a conspiracy intended to 
impede or overwhelm the capacity of state authorities to secure 
equal protection of the laws, even when there was no showing of 
discriminatory animus, and even when the object of the conspiracy 
was to violate a constitutional guarantee that applied solely to 
state actors.157 
Under Justice Souter's analysis, a conspiracy fell within the 
terms of the hindrance clause when its purpose was to hinder or 
prevent law enforcement authorities from providing .protection to 
women attempting to exercise their right to ab0rti0n.l~~ He con- 
cluded, however, that there had been no express finding that the 
purpose of the conspiracy was to prevent the police from protect- 
ing women seeking abortion services.16B Accordingly, Justice Souter 
was of the opinion that the case should have been remanded to the 
district court.leO 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, agreed with Justice Souter's anal- 
ysis of the hindrance clause,1e1 but believed that there was suffi- 
cient evidence in the record to support a finding that Operation 
Rescue had violated the hindrance clause.le2 In his view, the evi- 
dence established that Operation Rescue was involved in a nation- 
wide conspiracy, and that it occupied public streets and trespassed 
on the premises of private citizens in order to prevent or hinder 
law enforcement authorities from ensuring access to abortion clin- 
ics by women, a substantial number of whom 'travelled interstate 
to reach the clinics blockaded by the petitioners.le3 He believed 
that this conduct bore a striking similarity to the kind of zealous, 
politically motivated conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act.le4 
Justice Stevens concluded that one of the goals of the statute 
was to provide federal protection against the kind of disorder and 
law, then we have the right to say that anybody who undertakes to interfere and 
prevent the execution of that State law is amenable to this provision of the Constitu- 
tion, and to the law that we may make under it declaring it to be an offense against 
the United States. 
Id. at 514; accord id. at 486 (remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at 579 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). 
157. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 776-77 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
158. Id. at 777. 
159. Id. at 779. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 795-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
162. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 795-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 782. 
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anarchy that the state may be unable to c ~ n t r o l . ' ~ T h e r e  was evi- 
dence in the record that Operation Rescue's blockades had that 
effect. The lack of advance warning, combined with limited police 
resources, made it difficult for the police to prevent Operation Res- 
cue from effectively closing abortion clinics for several hours at a 
time.lee There were also examples of Operation Rescue overwhelm- 
ing local law enforcement officials by sheer force of numbers.lB7 
Justice Stevens also took issue with the majority's rejection of 
respondents' right to travel claim.'e8 In Justice Stevens' view, the 
right to travel interstate takes on greater importance in light of the 
diversity of regulation of abortion procedures among the states.lB9 
There was evidence in the record that interference with a woman's 
ability to visit another state to obtain an abortion was essential to 
the achievement of Operation Rescue's ultimate objective-the 
complete elimination of abortion services. Moreover, Justice Ste- 
vens contended that Operation Rescue's blockades made clinics in- 
accessible to women who had engaged in interstate travel for the 
purpose of obtaining an abortion.170 This burden on interstate 
travel was not only foreseeable, but was the intended consequence 
of the  blockader^.'^' In light of the factual record and findings of 
the district court, Justice Stevens concluded that Operation Res- 
cue had interfered with the right of women to travel interstate to 
seek abortions and, therefore, had violated the hindrance ~ 1 a u s e . l ~ ~  
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the 
majority's view that the respondents had failed to satisfy the class- 
based animus requirement. She concluded that § 1985(3) reached 
a conspiracy whose motivation was directly related to characteris- 
tics unique to a class.173 In Bray, the victims of Operation Rescue 
were linked by their ability to become pregnant and by the ability 
to terminate that condition.17" As these are characteristics that are 
unique to women, Justice O'Connor concluded that Operation Res- 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
168. Id. at 792. See also, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,200 (1973), where the Court held 
that a woman's right to engage in interstate travel for the purpose of seeking abortion ser- 
vices available in another state was protected under the privileges and immunities clause of 
the Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. IV, 8 2. 
169. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
174. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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cue had taken actions against these women due to characteristics 
unique to a class, and thereby violated the statute.176 
Similarly, Justice O'Connor rejected Operation Rescue's claim 
that i t  was not motivated by a discriminatory animus towards 
women, but by its opposition to abortion. She asserted that the 
petitioners were free to express their views on abortion, but they 
had gone beyond speech when they targeted women seeking abor- 
tions and took actions designed to prevent them from exercising 
their constitutional rights.17e She concluded that it was undeniable 
- 
that Operation Rescue's purpose was to target women seeking 
abortions and to prevent them from obtaining those services, and 
that this motivation satisfied Griffin's animus req~irernent . '~~ On 
the basis of the record below, Justice O'Connor concluded that Op- 
eration Rescue's actions, and the injuries it occasioned, fell 
squarely within the ambit of the statute.178 
In Bray, the majority rejected an opportunity to interpret 
§ 1985(3) in a manner consistent with congressional intent. The 
impetus for the enactment of the statute was an interstate conspir- 
acy that targeted individuals and groups of persons who sought to 
engage in activities or held views that were opposed by the con- 
spirators. The nineteenth century conspirators were activists who 
used unlawful means to achieve their ends. The tactics employed 
by the Ku Klux Klan included intimidation, threats of violence 
and the use of terror tactics. This was the evil that the Ku Klux 
Klan Act was designed to remedy, and it should have applied to 
similar conspiracies in the late twentieth century. 
While no one can contend seriously that Operation Rescue and 
the Ku Klux Klan are one and the same, the facts of the Bray case 
reveal that there are notable parallels between the two groups. Op- 
eration Rescue and its adherents formed an interstate conspiracy 
to interfere with the practice of abortion. The group went beyond 
the mere advocacy of ideas and engaged in trespassory conduct 
designed to stop women from obtaining abortions. In furtherance 
of this unlawful conspiracy, the group blockaded abortion clinics 
and denied access to the clinics, resulting in risks of physical and 
emotional harm to women who sought to use the blockaded facili- 
ties. Additionally, the local law enforcement authorities were una- 
ble, due to lack of resources or will, to provide adequate protection 
175. Id .  
176. Id.  
177. Id.  
178. Id.  
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to the women who sought to obtain abortion services at  the block- 
aded clinics. In light of these facts, the federal remedy created by 
Congress for the vindication of rights against private conspiratorial 
interference should have been available to women who sought the 
protection of the federal courts. 
Instead of permitting the use of a federal remedy to protect 
women seeking abortions, the majority, in an opinion that ignored 
both the legislative history of the statute and the egregious facts of 
the case, interpreted $ 1985(3) in an exceedingly narrow fashion so 
as to preclude the statute's application in the abortion context. In 
the past, the Court's approach to Reconstruction era civil rights 
statutes has been to accord them a sweep as broad as their lan- 
guage.170 In Bray, the majority did just the opposite, precluding 
application of the statute to a factual paradigm that its language 
clearly covered. After Bray, the only method for resurrecting 
$ 1985(3) was congressional action. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO PROVIDE A FEDERAL REMEDY 
AGAINST HE BLOCKADES OF ABORTION CLINICS 
In the wake of the Bray decision, two bills were introduced in 
Congress to address the national conspiracy by Operation Rescue 
to deny access to abortion clinics. In the House of Representatives, 
Congressman Charles Schumer introduced the Freedom of Access 
to Clinic Entrances Act.lBO In the Senate, Senator Edward Ken- 
179. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 
U.S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Price, 
383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
180. H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Section 2 of the proposed bill, as amended 
on March 25, 1993, provides as follows: 
(a) Whoever, with intent to prevent or discourage any person from obtaining repro- 
ductive health services, intentionally and physically obstructs, . . . the ingress or 
egress of another to a medical facility that affects interstate commerce . . . shall be 
subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) of this section and the civil remedy 
provided in subsection (c) of this section. 
(b) The penalty for an offense under subsection (a! of this section is a fine . . . or 
imprisonment- 
(1) for not more than one year, in the case of a first conviction under this 
section; and 
(2) for not more than three years, in the case of an offender who has been 
convicted of a previous offense under this section; 
or both such fine and imprisonment. 
Id. 
Section 2 (c) provides for a civil damage action: 
(c)(l) A qualified plaintiff may in a civil action obtain appropriate relief with respect 
to any violation of subsection (a) of this section. 
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nedy introduced a similarly entitled bi11.181 A major issue to be ad- 
dressed in connection with the proposed legislation is the extent of 
congressional power to remedy the blockades of Operation Rescue 
and similar organizations. One potential source of congressional 
power in the arena of public welfare is the Commerce Clause.182 
Under that clause, Congress has broad plenary power to legislate 
in the public welfare arena.lss The question remains, however, as 
to whether Congress has an adequate basis for developing legisla- 
tion regarding the blockades. The statement of purposes for the 
(c)(2) As used in this subsection, a "qualified plaintiff' with respect to a violation is - 
(A) the person whose ingress or egress is or is about to be obstructed . . . . 
(B) a person whose obtaining reproductive services is intended to be prevented 
or discouraged; 
(C) the medical facility, or any of its medical or administrative staff; or 
(D) the owner of the structure or place in which the medical facility is located. 
Id. 
Under section 3 of the proposed bill, a successful plaintiff could be awarded treble damages, 
including an award for pain and suffering and emotional distress, or damages in the amount 
of $5,000 whichever is greater. Punitive damages would not be available under the statute. 
Additionally, injunctive relief is available. Id. at  section 3. 
181. S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Section 3 of S. 636 provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(a) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.-Whoever- 
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally in- 
jures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or inter- 
fere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimi- 
date such person or any other person or class of persons, from- 
(A) obtaining abortion services; or 
(B) lawfully aiding another person to obtain abortion services; or 
(C) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a medical facility 
or in which a medical facility is located, or attempts to do so, because 
such facility provides abortion services; 
shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedy pro- 
vided in subsection (e). 
Id. 
Under subsection (b), a first offense of the proposed bill can be punished by a fine or 
imprisonment of not more than 1 year, or both. Second offenders can be punished by a fine 
or imprisonment of not more than 3 years, or both. If bodily injury results, the length of 
imprisonment can be up to 10 years, and if death results, an offender can be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a period of years or life. Id. at  section 3, subsection (b). Under subsection 
(e), a court may award damages, including punitive damages, and appropriate injunctive 
relief. Id. at  section 3, subsection (e). 
182. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, 3 8. 
183. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, $ 3  201-07, 42 U.S.C. 3 2000a (1982) (public 
accommodations); id. $3  701-16,42 U.S.C. 3 2000e (employment); see also, e.g., Katzenbach 
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964). 
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bills, and the facts adduced a t  the hearings on the proposed legis- 
lation, supports the conclusion that Congress has a rational basis 
for concluding that blockades of abortion clinics have an adverse 
impact on interstate commerce. 
Senate Bill 636 seeks to establish that it fits within the parame- 
ters of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Section 
2(a) states that medical clinics offering abortion services have been 
targeted by an interstate campaign of violence and obstruction 
aimed a t  closing t h e  facilities and intimidating those seeking to ob- 
tain abortion services.1B4 This conduct has denied women access to 
health care providers and exposes women to increased medical 
risks, thereby jeopardizing the public health and safety. Section 
.2(a)(4) states that the methods used to deny women access to 
these clinics include bombings, arson, murder, and other acts of 
force and threats of force.lB6 
After setting forth the factual predicate, section 2(a)(6) states 
that this conduct not only infringes upon women's ability to exer- 
cise their rights, but it also burdens interstate commerce, by inter- 
fering with the business activities of the medical clinics involved in 
interstate commerce.186 This section also states that this conduct 
forces women to travel from states where their access to reproduc- 
tive health services is obstructed to other states in order to obtain 
medical services.lB7 Section (2)(b) states that the purpose of the 
bill is to protect and promote the public health and safety by. 
prohibiting the use of force, threat of force or physical obstruction 
to injure, intimidate or interfere with a person seeking to obtain or 
provide abortion services.lBB 
In hearings on the House version of the bill, testimony was ad- 
duced that clearly showed that the activities of Operation Rescue 
prevented women who had traveled across state lines from gaining 
access to medical facilities, exposing them to physical risk.lB9 Testi- 
184. S .  636, $2(a).  
185. S .  636, §2(a)(4) .  
186. S .  636, $2(a)(6).  
187. Id.  
188. S.  636, $2. 
189. Hearings on  Clinic Blockades Before the  Subcomm. on  Crime and Criminal Jus- 
tice o f  the  House Comm. on  the  Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1992) [hereinafter 
House Hearings]. T h e  testimony o f  Silvia Doe o f  Virginia graphically demonstrates the  im-  
pact that t h e  Wichita,  Kansas, blockades had on  the  ability o f  women t o  obtain abortion 
services. Ms. Doe testified that  she traveled from her home state o f  Virginia t o  Kansas i n  
order t o  obtain a third trimester abortion, a service not provided in  Virginia. Ms. Doe fur- 
ther testified that  she had t o  wait two weeks before she could go t o  Wichita due  t o  Opera- 
tion Rescue's closing o f  the  clinic. House Hearings at  10. W h e n  she arrived in  Wichita,  i t  
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mony was also adduced that, in some instances, local law enforce- 
ment efforts to protect women were non-existent or limited a t  
best.lBO The testimony before the Senate Subcommittee demon- 
strated that the blockades had a deleterious effect on the ability of 
the clinics to function e c o n ~ m i c a l l y . ~ ~ ~  The facts demonstrate that 
women traveling in interstate commerce have been burdened due 
to Operation Rescue's blockades. Additionally, clinics have been fi- 
nancially damaged due to the violence of the blockaders and the 
reduction in business as a result of arson and bombings. Such tre- 
mendous impacts justify the proposed legislation. 
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has plenary power. The 
courts have sustained the exercise of that power when Congress 
has a rational basis for finding that an activity affects interstate 
commerce and employs reasonable means to regulate that activ- 
ity.lB2 With respect to regulations for the public welfare, Congress 
has been afforded a wide latitude under the Commerce Clause. In 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,le3 the Court upheld the 
took her three days to make her way through Operation Rescue's blockade, consisting of 
over 1,000 persons. After entering the clinic, she was forced to leave due to numerous bomb 
threats. Id. a t  11. Similar testimony was provided by Kathryn Maxwell of Canton, Missis- 
sippi, who testified that she was denied access to a physician's office for prenatal care be- 
cause Operation Rescue's blockaders were attempting to deny anyone access to this office 
because they alleged that abortions were performed at  that location. Id. at  18. The testi- 
mony of Vicki Robinson of Landover, Maryland, was similar in nature. House Hearings at  
20. 
190. House Hearings at  19. Ms. Maxwell testified that when she approached a police 
officer for assistance, he refused to help her gain access in the face of the mob. Id. Ms. Doe 
testified that i t  appeared to her that the police were unwilling to enforce the law to protect 
her. Id. at  24. 
191. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993: Hearings on S. 636 Before 
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Testi- 
mony of W. Craig a t  2). Willa Craig, Executive Director of the Blue Mountain Clinic, Mis- 
soula, Montana, testified that after numerous blockades by anti-abortion activists, her clinic 
was firebombed, and no one was arrested. As a result of the fire, the clinic was only able to 
provide a fraction of its former services. The clinic was unable to accept any new patients. 
Id. Ms. Craig referred to a report, prepared by the National Abortion Federation, that indi- 
cates that since 1977 there have been 36 bombings of abortion clinics, 81 arsons reported, 
327 clinic invasions, 84 cases of assault and battery, 563 clinic blockades, and 457 incidents 
of vandalism. Id. a t  4. The National Abortion Federation report, annexed to Ms. Craig's 
testimony, indicates that the total damage to clinics within the federation amounts to 
$1,599,833.00, due to vandalism, arsons and bombings. Id. at  7. 
192. See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964). 
193. 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964). In Heart of Atlanta, the owner of a motel in Atlanta, 
Ga., which denied service to African-Americans, challenged the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce clause. Heart of 
Atlanta, 379 U.S. at  243-44. The facts of the case revealed that the motel owner solicited 
customers from out-of-state through the use of national advertising media, served interstate 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 because, inter alia, Congress could enact 
legislation, under its Commerce Clause powers, to promote the 
general welfare by eliminating discrimination based on race. While 
Heart o f  Atlanta arguably involved an establishment that serviced 
or solicited interstate travelers, Katzenbach u. McClung involved a 
local restaurant that served a purely local clientele.le4 Neverthe- 
less, the Court held that Congress could have reasonably concluded 
that local discrimination created an artificial barrier to interstate 
commerce by restricting interstate travel of African-Americans and 
generally depressing the business climate.196 These cases demon- 
strate that Congress has broad powers under the Commerce 
Clause.lee Congress may regulate the activities of local enterprises 
so long as Congress rationally determines that conduct affects in- 
terstate commerce and employs a reasonable means to regulate 
that activity.le7 
The proposed Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act fits 
squarely within the aforementioned precedents. The blockaded 
clinics are engaged in interstate commerce. These facilities provide 
medical services, including family planning, prenatal care, and 
abortion services. Many of the clinics are housed in office buildings 
and hospitals. The clinics purchase equipment, goods and services, 
employ individuals and generate income. The effect of Operation 
Rescue on the clinics' ability to engage in interstate commerce is 
evident on the basis of the record before Congress and the federal 
cases wherein injunctions were issued against Operation Rescue. 
Just as the Court found that a local restaurant purchased goods 
that had moved in interstate commerce and came within the ambit 
of the Civil Rights of 1964, the courts should have little difficulty 
finding that Congress rationally determined that the blockading of 
abortion clinics has an adverse impact on interstate commerce, be- 
clients, and was located at the intersection o f  several major highways. Id. On the basis o f  
these facts, the Court concluded that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of  1964, 
properly exercised its Commerce Clause power. Id. at 258. 
194. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The  restaurant in question, Ollie's Barbecue, only provided 
take-out service to  African-Americans. The  evidence showed that the restaurant used a sub- 
stantial quantity o f  meat purchased by a local supplier from out-of-state sources. McClung, 
379 U.S. at 296. 
195. Id. at 300. 
196. See, e.g., Vincent A. Cirillo and Jay W .  ~ isenhofer ,  Reflections on the Congres- 
sional Commerce Power, 60 TEMP.  L. Q. 901, 912 (1987) ("[Tlhe congressional commerce 
power [has] emerged as a virtually unlimited power."); Charles P.  Light, Jr., The Federal 
Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 717, 728 (1963) ("[Ilt is difficult to  discern a meaningful 
limit t o  the [commerce] power . . . ."). 
197. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-77. 
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cause the clinics purchased goods and services that have traveled 
in interstate commerce. 
Another basis for holding that the blockading of abortion clinics 
has a negative impact on interstate commerce is the fact that nu- 
merous women travel interstate to obtain abortion services. The 
testimony before the House Subcommittee concerning clinic block- 
ades supports the view that women travel across state lines to ob- 
tain abortions.lB8 The congressional statement of findings and pur- 
pose for Senate Bill 636 also states that the blockades of abortion 
clinics have burdened interstate commerce by forcing women to 
travel to other states because access to clinics is impeded in their 
states due to the activities of Operation Rescue.1B9 Finally, the fed- 
eral cases provide support for a finding that numerous women 
travel interstate to obtain abortion services.200 Accordingly, the 
courts should have little difficulty finding that Congress rationally 
determined that the blockading of abortion clinics has a negative 
impact on women seeking to travel interstate to obtain abortions. 
After analyzing the factual basis for the Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, the courts will turn to an analysis of 
whether Congress chose a reasonable means to achieve its purpose 
of eliminating a burden on interstate commerce occasioned by the 
blockades. The Act proscribes the use of force, threats of force, 
physical obstruction to injure, intimidate, or interfere with an indi- 
vidual seeking abortion services, and the destruction of the prop- 
erty of medical facilities. Because the Act focuses solely on conduct 
that involves violence or physical obstruction, it could be deter- 
mined that the means Congress chose to effectuate legitimate ends 
were reasonably adapted to that purpose and not intended to sup- 
press a particular message.201 Finally, there is ample support for 
198. See notes 189-190 and accompanying text. 
199. See notes 184-188 and accompanying text. 
200. See, e.g., Bray, 113 S. Ct. at  762 (The Court accepted the district court's finding 
that substantial numbers of women traveled interstate to abortion clinics in the Washing- 
ton, D.C. area); New York National Org. For Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d at  1360. 
201. The Court has held that the "government generally has a freer hand in restricting 
expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word." Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). The Johnson Court concluded that where speech and nonspeech 
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, "a sufficiently important governmen- 
tal interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms" so long as the governmental interest is unrelated to the regulated 
expression. Id. at  407 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (Court 
upheld a statute prohibiting destruction of draft cards because the government had an im- 
portant interest in administering the selective service system)). The clinic access bill regu- 
lates violence, threats of violence, and physical destruction. The Act does not prohibit pick- 
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the' conclusion that the blockades of Operation Rescue adversely 
impact interstate commerce and that Congress, under the author- 
ity of the Commerce Clause, chose a reasonable means to regulate 
the conduct of the blockaders.202 
The battle over abortion rights has shifted from the courtrooms 
to the streets. Unsuccessful in their efforts before the Supreme 
Court to eliminate the constitutionally protected right of women to 
choose abortions, organized groups have employed violent means 
to prevent women from obtaining abortion services. These individ- 
uals have formed a national conspiracy that travels interstate to 
blockade medical facilities that provide abortion services. This 
conspiracy has used intimidation, bombs, arson, physical force and 
even murder, in an effort to achieve its ends. Local law enforce- 
ment agencies have proven either unable or unwilling to protect 
women seeking abortions. 
In the face of this nationwide conspiracy, women and abortion 
clinics turned to the federal courts for relief. Numerous federal 
judges issued injunctions under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
finding that the statute provided a remedy for the conduct of Op- 
eration Rescue and similar groups. Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court in Bray rejected that approach and removed federal protec- 
tion from women seeking abortion, leaving them to the will of the 
rnob and the whim of local authorities. 
In response to the Supreme Court's failure to afford federal pro- 
tection to women seeking abortion services and to uphold the in- 
tent of Congress in enacting the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress has 
proposed the Freedom Of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993. 
The Act seeks, in part, to restore the protection of the federal 
court to women seeking abortion services. The courts should recog- 
nize that the Act is legitimately grounded on Congress' authority 
to regulate interstate commerce, and should apply it to protect 
women seeking abortion services. Without such federal protection, 
it is likely that the violence and terror visited upon women seeking 
to exercise their constitutional rights will continue unabated. 
eting, demonstrating, counselling or other expressions of views regarding abortion. The 
federal government has an interest in preventing violence when that conduct has an adverse 
impact on interstate commerce, especially when local law enforcement efforts are inade- 
quate. The Act is limited to that objective and does not seek to restrict the peaceful expres- 
sion of ideas. 
202. See notes 192-197 and accompanying text. 
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